A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies

Tchakounte, Franklin and Nyassi, Virgile Simé and Danga, Duplex Elvis Houpa and Udagepola, Kalum Priyanath and Atemkeng, Marcellin (2020) A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies. EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems, 8 (30). e5. ISSN 2032-9407

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Abstract

A solution to help victims against phishing is anticipating and leveraging impacts related to phisher actions.In this regard, this work reshapes game theoretical logic between Intrusion Detection System (IDS) agents andinsiders to email spear-phishing interactions. The email spear-phishing attack is designed as a non-cooperativeand repeated game between opponents. Additionally, this work relies on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE)to build a game theoretical approach to predict the phisher’s future intent based on past actions of bothplayers. This approach is coupled with a recommendation strategy of appropriate allocation of resources toinvest to strengthen user protection. Simulations on spear-phishing scenarios demonstrate the ability of thefinal system to intuitively guess the most likely phisher decisions. This work provides intelligence to spear-phishing detectors and humans such that they can anticipate next phisher actions.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Attack, game theory, non-cooperative game, email spear-phishing, QRE
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Depositing User: EAI Editor IV
Date Deposited: 20 Apr 2021 07:37
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2021 07:37
URI: https://eprints.eudl.eu/id/eprint/2588

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