Matching with Stochastic Arrival

Thakral, Neil (2015) Matching with Stochastic Arrival. Matching with Stochastic Arrival, 2 (10). e4. ISSN 2312-8623

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We study matching in a dynamic setting, with applications to the allocation of public housing. In our model, objects of different types that arrive stochastically over time must be allocated to agents in a queue. For the case that the objects share a common priority ordering over agents, we introduce a strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies certain fairness and efficiency properties. More generally, we show that the mechanism continues to satisfy these properties if and only if the priority relations satisfy an acyclicity condition. We then turn to an application of the framework by evaluating the procedures that are currently being used to allocate public housing. The estimated welfare gains from adopting the new mechanism are substantial, exceeding $5,000 per applicant.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: market design, dynamic matching, public housing allocation
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Depositing User: EAI Editor IV
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2021 08:27
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2021 08:27

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